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ABSTRACT

In SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., the court incorrectly applied the
statutory public use bar and held the clinical trials did not constitute an
experimental use. This ruling set the bar too high. Applying a narrow construction
of the law, the CAFC invalidated a claim in a clear case of experimental use. The
decision not only misapplied the precedent defining an "inherent" feature of the
invention, but also essentially eliminated the need for applying the policies that
underlie and define the public use bar under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).
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INTRODUCTION
Pharmaceutical companies invest heavily in research and development of new
drugs. But, how can these companies be assured they will recoup the price of this
investment if a new successful drug or therapy is developed? The United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ("CAFC") in SmithKline Beecham Corp. v.
Apotex Corp. ("SmithKlind') dealt a major blow to the security of pharmaceutical
investments when it decided that clinical trials did not qualify for the experimental
use negation of the public use bar under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).1
Created by judges, the experimental use doctrine and its underlying policies aim
to strengthen an inventor's faith in the patent system, while ensuring that the
inventions are made available to society as quickly as possible. 2 By establishing a
precedent where these policies have no effect on the outcome of the court's decision,
the CAFC failed to serve the purpose of the experimental use doctrine and the public
use bar. Therefore, the court should reexamine the public use bar under § 102(b) so
that the application of this bar produces predictable outcomes consistent with its
3
underlying policies.
There are three main purposes of the United States federal patent system: "first
to foster and reward invention; second, to promote disclosure of inventions, to
stimulate further innovation, and to permit the public to practice the invention once
the patent expires; and third, to assure that ideas there for the free use of the
4
public."
* J.D. Candidate, May 2006, The John Marshall Law School. The author would like to thank
his family and friends for their continuous support. The author would also like to thank some of the
people who made this article possible, Prof. Mark E. Wojcik, Prof. Doris Long, Troy A. Groetken,
Mark W. Scott and Anatoliy N. Sokolov, in addition to many others. Last but not least the author
would like to thank his editors and the entire board of The John Marshall Review of Intellectual
Property Law for their help, support and editorial assistance.
' See generaflySmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 365 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2004). On
April 21, 2004, the CAFC overturned the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois and held
that clinical trials did not constitute an experimental use because they were not aimed at testing
claimed features of the invention. Id. at 1308.
2 See generally City of Elizabeth v. Am. Nicholson Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 134-35 (1877)
(recognizing the experimental use doctrine for the first time).
3 On April 8, 2004 the CAFC granted en banc review of this case on the limited purpose of
addressing the experimental use issue. SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., No. 03-1285,

2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 5671, at *3 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see also 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000). The statute
states that:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless . . . the invention was patented or
described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country or in public use or
on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of the application for
patent in the United States.

Id.
4 Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262-63 (1979).
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The experimental use negation of the public use bar fits squarely into the first
purpose articulated above. Experimental use allows the inventor to pursue an
interest in testing and perfecting his invention while preserving his patent rights
should a patent issue. 5 Courts foster invention by assuring that the patent system
instills confidence in all inventors, including pharmaceutical companies.
This
confidence results in pharmaceutical companies continuing to invest heavily in
research and development of new drugs.
This comment focuses on analysis of reduction to practice, as well as the
application and effect of the SmithKline decision on the future of the statutory public
use bar under § 102(b). Part I provides background information regarding the
development and the policy underlying the public use bar under § 102(b), the
negation of this bar through experimental use and how courts determine a reduction
to practice for the purpose of applying this statutory bar. Part I also introduces the
parties involved in SmithKline and the appellate history of this infringement action.
Part II analyzes and critiques the SmithKline decision to predict its effect on future
cases and the interpretation of the experimental use doctrine. Part III sets forth
proposed solutions and policy considerations. In particular, Part III suggests to
adjust the application of the public use bar to realign it with the policies that shaped
the bar's development. Finally, Part IV concludes the discussion by providing an
overview of the problem and summarizing the potential solutions.

I.BACKGROUND
A. Introduction to the Case Law, Statutes and the Analysis Employed by the Court
in SmithKline
The United States Constitution vested in Congress the power "To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." 6 This
provision gave Congress the power to develop the national patent system and shape
it as necessary, resulting in the system that exists today. The desire to further such
progress has motivated the courts over the years to create the following policies and
doctrines.

1. Public Use
The statutory bar under § 102(b) prevents a patent from issuing, or negates an
already issued patent, if the invention becomes available in public use or on sale in

See Kurtis A. Kemper, Annotation, When is Public Use of Invention, More Than One Year
Before PatentApplication, for Experimental Purposes,So That 35 US.C. § 102(b) Does Not Prevent
Issuanee of Vald Patent, 171 A.L.R. FED. 39 (2001).
13U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, di. 8.
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the United States, more than one year prior to the filing date of the application. 7
Public use, for the purpose of this statute, occurs when someone other than the
inventor uses the claimed invention without any confidentiality restriction. 8 Several
underlying policies drive the application of the public use bar. Courts must apply
these policies when evaluating cases because the policies, in effect, define the public
use bar. 9 These policies include:
i. Encouraging the inventor to promptly disclose new and useful
information;
ii. Preventing the extension of the length of patent protection by not
allowing the inventor to reap commercial benefits for longer than the
statutorily authorized time period; and
iii. Discouraging "the removal of inventions from public domain which
the public justifiably comes to believe are freely available." 10
Courts consider all three policies when determining whether to invalidate a
claim for public use.11 In particular, courts emphasize the discouragement of
removing inventions believed by the public to be available. 12 However, these policies
have historically taken a back seat to the interests of the inventor where the court
13
found the public use occurred for the purpose of experimentation.

2. Experimental Use Doctrine
Courts have recognized that an inventor may conduct extensive tests of his
invention, even in the public eye, if the experiments 1 4 aim to bring the invention to
7 See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000). For an extensive discussion of the history and development of
the Public Use doctrine as well as the underlying policies, see generallyShashank Upadhye, To Use
or Not to Use: Reforming Patent Infringement the Public Use Bar; and the Experimental Use
Doctrine as Applied to Clinical Testing of Pharmaceuticaland Medical Device Inventions, 4 MINN.
INTELL. PROP. REV. 1 (2002).
s See Netscape Communications Corp. v. Konrad, 295 F.3d 1315, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (finding
lack of a confidentiality agreement significant because the disclosure was to a person skilled in the
art of the invention who could easily demonstrate the invention to others). Further, the invention
may be used by the public for the purpose of the statutory bar even if such use occurs outside of the
"public eye." See Egbert v. Lippmann, 104 U.S. 333, 336 (1881).
9 See Tone Bros. v. Sysco Corp., 28 F.3d 1192, 1198 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (discussing the underlying
policies of the public use bar and listing the underlying policies).
10See Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 550 (Fed. Cir. 1990); see also
TP Labs., Inc. v. Profi Positioners, Inc., 724 F.2d 965, 968 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
11See Cont'l Plastics Containers v. Owens Brockway Plastic Prods., 141 F.3d 1073, 1079 (Fed.
Cir. 1998).
12 See id.
13 See Jay David Schainholz, Note: The Validity of Patents After Market Testing: A New and
Improved Experimental Use Doctrine, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 371, 383 (1985); see also Upadhye, supra
note 7, at 12 (discussing the experimental use doctrine historically).
1' See 2 CHISUM, supra note 14, § 6.02[7][b] (2005). Looking to the authority on what
constitutes an experiment there seems to be a split: while some cases suggest an experiment should
be performed with an eye toward "developing, perfecting, completing, or reducing to practice the
invention." Id.; see also Aerovox Corp. v. Polymet Mfg. Corp., 67 F.2d 860, 862 (2d Cir. 1933)
(holding that an inventor may test his invention "not only to put it into definitive form, but to see
whether his ideas are worth exploiting, [however,] if in so doing he does in fact exploit the completed
invention commercially he takes a chance that he may lose his patent").
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perfection or are designed to ascertain whether the invention will work for its
intended purpose. 15 Supreme Court decisions applying the experimental use doctrine
seem to indicate that as long as public use of an invention remains restricted to
experiments reasonably necessary to determine the practical utility of the invention,
courts should avoid invalidating patents under 102(b).16 This line of thinking seems
to directly conflict with the policies underlying the application of the statutory bar
described above. 17 In some cases, however, the importance of delivering completed
inventions to the public outweighs the policies defining public use.1 8 Courts resolve
this conflict of policies through the application of the reasonable purpose test.1 9
Additionally, court considers the totality of the circumstances when determining
whether a use that is not experimental should be considered public within the

15When the delay to take out a patent is justified by a bona fide effort "to bring [the] invention
to perfection, or to ascertain whether it will answer the purpose intended" the inventor does not
acquire an undue advantage over the public because it is in the public's interest that "the invention
should be perfect and properly tested before a patent is granted." SmithKline Beecham Corp. v.
Apotex Corp., 286 F. Supp. 2d 925, 933 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (quoting Pfaff v. Wells Elec., Inc., 525 U.S.
55, 64 (1999)).
16; In City of Elizabeth v. Am. Nicholson Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126 (1877), seventy five feet of
pavement was laid down on a publicly used road owned by the company for the purpose of testing its
durability through constant use by different types of wagons and the effect of weather conditions on
the road. Id. at 126-30. Explaining its decision not to apply the statutory public use bar the Court
stated:
When the subject of invention is a machine, it may be tested and tried in a
building, either with or without closed doors. In either case, such use is not a
public use, within the meaning of the statute, so long as the inventor is engaged,
in good faith, in testing its operation. He may see cause to alter it and improve it,
or not. His experiments will reveal the fact whether any and what alterations may
be necessary. If durability is one of the qualities to be attained, a long period,
perhaps years, may be necessary to enable the inventor to discover whether his
purpose is accomplished. And though, during all that period, he may not find that
any changes are necessary, yet he may be justly said to be using his machine only
by way of experiment; and no one would say that such a use, pursued with a bona
fide intent of testing the qualities of the machine, would be a public use, within
the meaning of the statute. So long as he does not voluntarily allow others to
make it and use it, and so long as it is not on sale for general use, he keeps the
invention under his own control, and does not lose his title to a patent.
Id. at 134-35. Other Supreme Court cases include: City of Elizabeth v. Am. Nicholson Pavement
Co., 97 U.S. 126 (1877); Egbert v. Lippman, 104 U.S. 333 (1881); Hall v. MacNeale, 107 U.S. 90
(1883); Smith & Griggs Mfg. Co. v. Sprague, 123 U.S. 249 (1887); Int'l Tooth-Crown Co. v. Gaylord,
140 U.S. 55 (1891); Root v. Third Ave. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. 210 (1892); see also 2-6 CHISUM, supra
note 14, § 6.02[7] [a] (discussing the Supreme Court cases listed above).
17See TP Labs., Inc. v. Prof l Positioners, Inc., 724 F.2d 965, 968 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
18 See Schainholz, supra note 13, at 383 (explaining that this approach under the experimental
use doctrine is evidence of "society's willingness to accept the risk of detrimental reliance when,
because of the nature of the product, public experimentation must take place"). The balance
between the conflicting policies in this case is discussed infra Part III. C.
19 See Kimball Int'l, Inc. v. Allen Organ Co., 212 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 584, 586 (S.D. Ind. 1981)
("The determination of the inventor's purpose, motive, intent, etc., is essential in the determination
of the applicability of the experimental use doctrine."); 2 CHISUM, supra note 14, § 6.02[7] [b] ("If the
purpose was experimental and the activity reasonable, it does not matter that the inventor benefits
incidentally from the activity.").
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meaning of § 102(b).20 Specifically, courts have utilized factors, including the length
of the test period, receipt of payment for the testing, whether any obligations of
confidentiality between the participants in the test and the inventor existed, records
of testing kept by the inventor and any progress made, whether persons other than
2 1
the inventor performed the testing, and finally the number of tests performed.
The experimental use negation 22 does not extend beyond the purpose of
perfecting the invention or experiments performed with respect to features not
claimed in the invention. 23 However, specific precedent exists where courts have
allowed testing of features not expressly claimed in the patent application, when
24
those tests concerned features "inherent" in the claimed invention.

3. Reduction to Practice
An important step in the public use analysis involves the determination of
whether an inventor has reduced his invention to practice. Once reduced to practice,
20 See Netscape Communications Corp. v. Konrad, 295 F.3d 1315, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Micro

Chem., Inc. v. Great Plains Chem. Co., 103 F.3d 1538, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (explaining that "all of
the circumstances surrounding the sale or offer to sell, including the stage of development of the
invention and the nature of the invention, must be considered and weighted against the policies
underlying section 102(b)").
21 See Hycor Corp. v. Schlueter Co., 740 F.2d 1529, 1535 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (finding lack of a
confidentiality agreement when considered in conjunction with other factors enough to establish a
public use for the purpose of § 102(b)); Baxter Int'l, Inc. v. Cobe Labs., Inc., 88 F.3d 1054, 1060 (Fed.
Cir. 1996) (listing evidentiary factors); Netscape Communications Corp., 295 F.3d at 1320-21
(discussing and applying factors leading the court to hold the patent invalid).
22 SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 365 F.3d 1306, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
In
discussing the development of the experimental use doctrine Judge Rader stated: "The experimental
use doctrine is not an 'exception' to the public use bar because it does not shift the burden of proof
from the accused infringer to the patentee. Rather it operates to negate application of the public use
bar." Id.
Therefore, the burden is on the challenger of the patent to prove that the nonexperimental use was public under § 102(b). However, the patent owner is not completely relieved
of any duty; once an accused infringer makes a prima facie case of public use, it becomes the duty of
the patent owner to counter that showing. See TP Labs., Inc. v. Prof 1 Positioners, Inc., 724 F.2d
965, 971 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (discussing the shifting burden of proof).
23 In re Smith, 714 F.2d 1127, 1136 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (reasoning that when the party already
knew the technical efficacy of their invention, tests measuring the efficacy were unnecessary).
"Testing or experimentation performed with respect to non-claimed features of the device does not
show that the invention was the subject of experimentation." W. Marine Elecs. v. Furuno Elec. Co.,
764 F.2d 840, 847 (Fed. Cir. 1985); see also In re Application of Theis, 610 F.2d 786, 793 (C.C.P.A.
1979) (holding that "most of the 'experimenting' done on the systems was done for the purpose of
correcting problems with the telephone interface. The claims do not require that the system be used
with a telephone system. Thus, any work done to improve the operation of the system as it is used
with telephone equipment does not aid appellant's experimental use argument.").
24 See EZ Dock, Inc. v. Schafer Sys. Inc., 276 F.3d 1347, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2002). In this case,
even though the patentee sold the dock more than one year before filing the patent application the
court agreed that the use of the dock was experimental. Id. at 1353-54. Significantly, the court
accepted evidence showing that the reason for the sale was to determine whether the dock would
function in its intended environment even though the experiments did not test features claimed in
the patent. IN.; see also Seal-Flex, Inc. v. Athletic Track & Court Constr., 98 F.3d 1318, 1320, 1324
(Fed. Cir. 1996); Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 550-51 (Fed. Cir.
1990).
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the invention works for the purpose intended and as such, concludes any need for
further experimentation for the purpose of the § 102(b) bar. 2 5 In Estee Lauder v.
L'Orea, Judge Mayer applied a three-element test to determine a reduction to
practice. 26 The specific elements of the test included: "(i) production of a composition
of matter satisfying the limitations of the count, (ii) recognition of the composition of
matter, and (iii) recognition of a specific practical utility for the composition." 27 The
court held that an invention is reduced to practice under 35 U.S.C. § 112 when the
inventor "actually prepare[s] the composition and [knows] that it will work." 28 This
recognition of practical utility differs from the utility requirement under 35 U.S.C. §
29
101 discussed in the next section.
An invention cannot be reduced to practice by accident; the inventor must
recognize the tests establishing a reduction to practice as successful.3 0 Recognition of
success directly intertwines with the utility requirement of patentability. 31 A
chemical compound, like all inventions, must have utility in order to qualify for
patent protection. 32 However, for a chemical compound, reduction to practice under §
112 cannot occur until such compound becomes completely composed.33 Therefore,
regardless of whether the claims of the patent contain any specific reference to

25

See Smithline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 286 F. Supp. 2d 925, 935 (N.D. Ill. 2001);

see also RCA Corp. v. Data Gen. Corp., 887 F.2d 1056, 1061 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (holding that "having
been reduced to practice, a sale or offer to sell the Cole invention is no longer justifiable as
experimental use.").
26 129 F.3d 588, 593 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding that when testing is necessary to establish
utility, there must be recognition and appreciation that the tests were successful for reduction to
practice to occur).
27 Id. at 592.
28 Id.; see also Hahn v. Wong, 892 F.2d 1028, 1032 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Burroughs Wellcome Co. v.
Barr Labs., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1228 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Reduction to practice is effected when the
inventor's conception is in a form that is capable of practical and successful use. Pyrene-Minimax
Corp. v. Palmer, 89 F.2d 505, 510 (D.C. Cir. 1937).
29 Compare Commonwealth Eng'g Co. v. Ladd, 199 F. Supp. 51, 53 (D.D.C. 1961) (finding that
if the invention possesses any degree of usefulness, it satisfies the utility requirements of § 101),
with Burroughs Wellcome Co., 40 F.3d at 1228 (holding that a reduction to practice requires "the
discovery that an invention actuallyworks" (emphasis added)).
30 See Josserand v. Taylor, 138 F.2d 58, 65 (C.C.P.A. 1943) (finding that accidental practice of
an invention is not a "conscious incorporation of the invention in issue such as would constitute a
reduction to practice."); Mycogen Plant Sci., Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 243 F.3d 1316, 1336 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (reasoning that "accidental, unappreciated reduction to practice should not constitute a 'true'
reduction to practice").
31 See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (to get a patent the process at issue must be useful).
32 See Blicke v. Treves, 241 F.2d 718, 719 (C.C.P.A. 1957). In this case the appellant relies on
the Supreme Court case of Corona Cord Tire Co. v. Dovan Chemical Corp. and argues that the
making of a compound without testing is sufficient to show a reduction to practice. Id. However,
the CAFC has repeatedly considered that decision and found that as it relates to the necessity of
tests the decision is only dictum and cannot be taken to mean that the mere production of a
compound without testing will always be sufficient for reduction to practice. Blicke, 241 F.2d at 720.
Past court decisions have shown that a certain common sense approach should be applied when
evaluating whether tests are necessary because some devices are so simple that once constructed,
are sufficient proof of reduction to practice. See, e.g., Gordon v. Hubbard, 347 F.2d 1001, 1006
(C.C.P.A. 1965) (mere construction can be used to show that the device functions satisfactorily).
33 See Corona Cord Tire Co. v. Dovan Chem. Corp., 276 U.S. 358, 383 (1928).
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utility, the invention remains incomplete unless the utility is obvious or established
by proper tests.

3 4

4. The Utility Requirement Under 35 US..

§ 101

The legal requirements for patentability include novelty, utility and
nonobviousness. 35 To meet the utility requirement under 35 U.S.C. § 101, an
invention must perform a "useful" function, or some function that can benefit
society. 36 However, the standard for proving utility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is very
low. If the invention possesses any degree of usefulness, it satisfies the utility
7
requirements of § 101.3
Courts do not require a higher standard of proof for utility when dealing with a
chemical compound.38 Many courts, however, have recognized the difficulty of
predicting pharmaceutical behavior and proceeded cautiously before recognizing the
utility of a compound without clinical proof.3 9 For this reason, proof of utility of a
40
chemical compound usually requires tests or other evidence of the asserted utility.
Furthermore, because of this higher standard, even when those skilled in the art
41
know the behavior of analogous compounds, courts require evidence of utility.

34 See Bhuk, 241 F.2d at 720. Reduction to practice is a question that must be decided based
on the facts of the case involved. Id.
35 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-03 (2000).
36 See 1 CHISUM, supra note 14, § 4.02. The invention must be "more than a mere curiosity, a
scientific process exciting wonder yet not producing physical results, or [a] frivolous or trifling
article or operation not aiding in the progress nor increasing the possession of the human race." Id.
(citations omitted).
'37See Commonwealth Eng'g Co. v. Ladd, 199 F. Supp. 51, 53 (D.D.C. 1961) (emphasis added).
38 1 CHISUM, supra note 14, § 4.04[2]. The test remains "whether one with ordinary skill in the
art to which the invention pertains would question the assertion of utility, and if so, whether the
inventor has supplied such evidence through tests or otherwise as would convince such a person of
the invention's asserted utility." Id.
3 Seec Fujikawa v. Wattanasin, 93 F.3d 1559, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
It may be difficult to predict, however, whether a novel compound will exhibit
pharmacological activity, even when the behavior of analogous compounds is
known to those skilled in the art. Consequently, testing is often required to

establish practical utility . . . . In

other words, there must be a sufficient

correlation between the tests and an asserted pharmacological activity so as to
convince those skilled in the art, to a reasonable probability, that the novel
compound will exhibit the asserted pharmacological behavior.
Id. (citations omitted).
40 "Proof of utility under this section may be established by clinical or in vivo or in vitro data,
or a combination of these, which would be convincing to those skilled in the art." 1 CHISUAM, supra
note 14, § 4.04[2]. Tests in vitro mean: "In an artificial environment, referring to a process or
reaction occurring therein, as in a test tube or culture media." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY
919 (27th ed. 2000). Tests in vivo mean: "In the living body, referring to a process or reaction
occurring therein." Id. If the utility of the compound is solely for the treatment of humans, evidence
of utility must generally be clinical evidence. CHISUM, supra § 4.04[2]. In SmithKline, the trial
court held the clinical trials on humans necessary before the invention could be reduced to practice.
SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 286 F. Supp. 925, 936 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
41 Fujikawa, 93 F.3d at 1564 (finding that "it may be difficult to predict ... whether a novel
compound will exhibit pharmacological activity, even when the behavior of analogous compounds is
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5. Claim Construction
The claims of a patent define the invention protected by the patent. 42 However,
claims function only as legal definitions and not descriptions; therefore, construing
43
claims involves looking to the drawings and the specification.
When evaluating an invention for the purpose of applying the public use bar
under § 102(b), courts consider each claim of the patent individually. 44 Additionally,
45
when a court considers a claim it must afford that claim a presumption of validity.
To rebut this presumption, the movant must meet a standard of proof greater than a
preponderance of the evidence. 46 Further, a patent application may only cover a
single independent invention, however, using multiple claims can broaden the scope
4
of that single invention. '

known to those skilled in the art. Consequently, testing is often required to establish practical
utility.").
42 See Altoona Publix Theatres, Inc. v. Am. Tri-Ergon Corp., 294 U.S. 477, 487 (1935); Gen.
Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp. 304 U.S. 364, 369 n.5 (1938).
An applicant for a patent must include in his application one or more claims
which set forth the parameters of the invention. These claims measure the
invention for determining patentability both during examination and after
issuance when validity is challenged. They also determine what constitutes
infringement. A claim recites a number of elements or limitations, and will cover
or 'read on' only those products (or processes) that contain all such elements or
limitations. Effective claims must be neither too broad (i.e., cover the prior art or
matter not adequately described in the specification) nor too narrow (i.e., fail to
cover all possible embodiments of the applicant's invention). The applicant may
for safety's sake include a reasonable number of claims of varying scope.
1 CHISUM, supra note 14, Glossary at 3.
43 See Maclaren v. B-I-W Group, Inc., 401 F. Supp 283, 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), -rev'don other
grounds, 535 F.2d 1367 (2d Cir. 1976). Recitation of every element that is needed for practical
utilization of claimed subject matter is not necessary in the claim. Bendix Corp. v. United States,
600 F.2d 1364, 1369 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
44 See Lough v.Brunswick Corp., 86 F.3d 1113, 1122 n.5 (Fed.Cir. 1996).
4 See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000) (patents are presumed valid); see also Parker v. Motorola, Inc.,
524 F.2d 518, 521 (5th Cir. 1975) (explaining that presumption of validity is based upon "the
experience and expertise of patent office ... and [the] recognition that patent approval is a species of
[an] administrative determination supported by evidence," and the standard of proof to rebut this
presumption is "greater than mere preponderance of evidence.").
46See Parker, 524 F.2d at 521.
47See Monsanto Chem. Co. v. Coe, 145 F.2d 18, 19 n.41 (D.C. Cir. 1944).
Two or more independent inventions can not be claimed in one application; but
where several distinct inventions are dependent upon each other and mutually
contribute to produce a single result they may be claimed in one application:
Provided, That more than one species of an invention, not to exceed three, may be
claimed in one application if that application also includes an allowable claim
generic to all the claimed species. In the first action on an application containing
a generic claim or claims and claims to more than one species there under the
examiner, if he is of the opinion after a complete search that no generic claim
presented is allowable, shall require the applicant in his response to that action to
elect that species of his invention to which his claims shall be restricted if no
generic claim is finally held allowable.
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B. Introduction to the Partiesand the Lower CourtDecision

1. The SmithKline Beecham Corporation
SmithKline Beecham Corporation (now GlaxoSmithKline) focuses its business
on research, development, manufacture and sale of pharmaceutical products
throughout the world. 48 SmithKline filed an application for the drug Paxil®49 on
October 23, 1986, which established the "critical date" 50 for the purpose of this
litigation. 51 Before filing the application, SmithKline conducted clinical trials to test
52
the safety and efficacy of the drug as an antidepressant.

2. The Apotex Corporation
The Apotex Corporation is a pharmaceutical company specializing in
manufacturing, biotechnology
research and distribution in the generic
pharmaceuticals market. Apotex sought to create its own generic version of Paxil®
and filed an ANDA application with the FDA in 1998. 53 Additionally, Apotex
asserted in its case against SmithKline that its version of the antidepressant would
not infringe SmithKline's patent and therefore indicated through a Paragraph IV
certification its intention to market the drug before the expiration of patent No.
54
4,721,723 (" '723 patent").

3. Case Development
48 See SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 286 F. Supp. 2d 925, 929 (N.D. Ill. 2001).

49 See U.S. Patent No. 4,721,723 (issued Jan. 26, 1988).
50 Critical date is the term used by the courts as the date on which the one-year term starts for
the purpose of applying the public use bar § 102(b). Jn re Epstein, 32 F.3d 1559, 1564 n.5 (Fed. Cir.
1994).
51 The '723 patent in this case was issued in 1988, but the FDA approval process for marketing
the drug was not completed until 1993. SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 365 F.3d 1306,
1309 (Fed. Cir. 2004). This means that the drug was not on the market for five years undergoing
clinical trials strictly for the purpose of FDA approval. Id. The clinical trials had no effect on the
time limit of patent protection of the '723 patent leaving the drug only thirteen out of the eighteen
years available to market and sell the drug. Id.
52 The clinical trials began May 3, 1985 and were concluded on December 29, 1986.
SmithKne Beecham Corp., 286 F. Supp. 2d at 932. SmithKline designed a rigorous test protocol to
be used by the investigators and conducted site visits to make sure the protocol was followed. Id.
Patients involved in the study knew that the drug was used as part of the study but not if it was
administered to them as five out of the seven tests used were "double blinded." -d. A double-blind
test is a control group test where neither the evaluator nor the subject knows which items are
controls. See SmithKline Beecham Corp., 365 F.3d at 1309. These tests are conducted to reduce
error, self-deception and bias. Id. The patients did not have to pay to participate in the study and
the clinical trials lasted less than two years. See SmithKline Beecham Corp., 286 F. Supp. 2d at
935.
53 See SmithKline Beecham Corp., 365 F.3d at 1309.
54 SmithKline Beecham Cop., 365 F.3d at 1309; see 21 U.S.C. § 3550)(2)(A)(IV) (2000).
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On the Basis of Apotex's ANDA filing, SmithKline initiated an infringement
action under 35 U.S.C. § 271 (e)(2), alleging multiple theories of infringement.
However, this comment's focus is only upon the public use defense initiated by
Apotex. The district court found that SmithKine exercised sufficient control of the
clinical trials and that the clinical trials were experimental in purpose. Therefore,
the lower court determined SmithKline's actions were consistent with the goals
underlying the experimental use doctrine. 55 As such, the court declined to apply the
statutory bar under § 102(b). 56 The CAFC reversed and applied the public use bar
under § 102(b). 57 The following sections focus on the decision of the CAFC.

II. ANALYSIS
In SmithKline, the CAFC in a 2-1 decision reversed the district court, finding
that SmithKline's clinical trials to determine the efficacy of the drug as an
antidepressant constituted a public use under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).58 This section
considers whether the CAFC erred in its application of the public use bar of § 102(b).
Part A examines whether the court correctly analyzed claim 1 of the '723 patent.
Part B discusses the decision and the precedent it advances. Part C analyzes
whether the decision advanced the underlying policies of patent law and the public
use bar.

A. The CourtIncorrectlyFound That the ClinicalTrials Involved Testing of Features
Not Inherent to the Invention
The antidepressant properties of the claimed compound, PHC hemihydrate, are
inherent to the structure of the compound. Those properties had to be considered for
the utility analysis under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and the reduction to practice analysis
under § 112. 59 Therefore, courts should consider those same properties claimed
features of the invention for the purpose of § 102(b) analysis. Part 1 of this section

5 SmithlMine Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 286 F. Supp. 2d 925, 934 (N.D. Ill. 2001)
(applying the totality of circumstances test and finding that the strict protocol, visits to the site by
SmithKline, the investigator agreement, lack of payment and the duration of the trials were all a
strong indication that the trials were experimental in their nature and purpose).
5 Id. at 936. In the opinion, Judge Kocoras stated that "the reduction to practice rule
essentially mirrors the unchallenged requirement that any qualifying experimental use be aimed at
perfecting the invention or testing its effectiveness." The Judge also found that further tests were
necessary to determine whether the drug would function for its intended use. See id. at 938.
57 See SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 365 F.3d 1306, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(holding that the clinical trials were not directed at testing claimed features of the invention).
However, on April 8, 2004 the CAFC granted en banc review of this case for the limited purpose of
addressing the experimental use issue. SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., No. 03-1285,
2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 5671, at *3 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
58 Smith-h ne, 365 F.3d at 1320.
59 Reduction to practice analysis is implicated in this case as one cannot experiment with an
invention for the purpose of negating the statutory public use bar under § 102(b) if an invention is
reduced to practice. Smithnle Beecham Corp., 286 F. Supp. 2d at 935 (noting that experimental
use necessarily ends when the invention at issue is reduced to practice).
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discusses how a court determines an inherent feature and part 2 explains why the
antidepressant properties of PHC hemihydrate are classified as inherent features.

1. The InherentFeaturesAnalysis
Generally, the experimental use negation of the public use bar applies only to
expressly claimed features of the invention. 60 However, in SmithKline, the CAFC
acknowledged that instances exist where the experimental use doctrine remains
applicable even though the experiments reflect features not claimed in the
invention. 61 In exceptional cases, courts have permitted the application of the
experimental use doctrine to negate public use when an inventor experimented with
62
features "inherent" to the express claims of his invention.
While patent law does not discuss what makes a feature "inherent", case law
sheds some light on this matter. In at least three instances, the CAFC characterized
features of the invention as sufficiently "inherent" and therefore negated the public
use aspect of experiments directed at those features. 63 For example, in EZDock v.
Schafer Systems, the issue of the statutory bar under § 102(b) arose when the
inventor tested his invention, a type of dock, in rough, choppy waters. 64 The claim at
issue in EZ Dock did not specifically refer to the ability of the dock to function in
60 Soe In re Application of Theis, 610 F.2d 786, 793 (C.C.P.A. 1979); Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co.
v. Kent Indus., Inc., 409 F.2d 99, 101 (6th Cir. 1969); In re Brigance, 792 F.2d 1103, 1109 (Fed. Cir.
1986).
61 Smith-lrne, 365 F.3d at 1318. The CAFC found that the antidepressant properties of the
PHC hemihydrate are not inherent to the structure of the compound and held that "testing the
medical efficacy and viability of PHC hemihydrate is not testing claimed features of the structural
invention in claim 1." Id. at 1320. However, Judge Gajarsa, while concurring in the decision, wrote
a colloquial dissent, disagreeing with the majority on the issue of application of the public use bar,
in which he stated:
In all four cases, the claims at issue were product claims that did not claim the
tested features explicitly. In all four cases, the patentees possessed the claimed
product in substantial enough form to test their products' performance at their
intended functions. The majority does not explain why only one of these four
patentees had reduced its claimed invention to practice sufficiently to preclude
the experimental use doctrine.
I see no principled grounds on which to
distinguish this case from our precedent ....
The majority seems to be trying to
reach an ultimate conclusion of invalidity while avoiding the road less traveled.
Id. at 1325 (discussing EZ Dock, Inc. v. Schafer Sys. Inc., 276 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Seal-Flex,
Inc. v. Athletic Track & Court Constr., 98 F.3d 1318, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 1996); and Manville Sales Corp.
v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
62 See, e.g., EZDock, 276 F.3d at 1347; Seal-Flex, 98 F.3d at 1318; Manville Sales, 917 F.2d at
544.
6:3 See EZ Dock, 276 F.3d at 1353 (reasoning that whether the feature of the invention is
inherent, is determined by looking to the nature of the invention, the claim's reference to the subject
matter is enough to satisfy the "claimed feature" requirement of experimentation); Manville Sales,
917 F.2d at 550-51 (holding that "[w]hen durability in an outdoor environment is inherent to the
purpose of the invention then further testing to determine the invention's ability to serve that
purpose will not subject the invention to a section 102(b) bar"); see also City of Elizabeth v. Am.
Nicholson Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 133-34 (1877) (concluding that a road surface test for
"durability" by observation over six years of exposure to heavily loaded wagons constituted an
experimental use).
64 EZDock, 276 F.3d at 1349-50.
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rough choppy water; it covered the dock regardless of its durability.6 5 The court,
however, found the ability of the dock to function in such conditions a feature
inherent to the ability of the dock to function as a dock. Therefore, it was covered by
the claim. 66 In EZ Dock, the court focused on the nature and purpose of the
invention. As a result, the court determined that features which are inseparable
from the claimed invention should be included in the claimed feature analysis under
§ 102(b). 67 Similarly, in Manville Sales Corp. v. ParamountSystems, Inc., the court
looked to the purpose of the invention to determine whether the properties were
inherent.68 Therefore, a feature inseparable from the invention, or its purpose,
qualifies as an inherent feature for the application of § 102(b) analysis. 69

2.

The Antidepressant Properties of PHC Hemihydrate are Inherent Inseparable
Featuresof the Compound

In SmithKline, the court found that claim 1, the only claim at issue, covered the
compound, PHC hemihydrate, regardless of its use as an antidepressant, because the
70
structural claim did not expressly claim the antidepressant properties as a feature.
Furthermore, the court did not consider the antidepressant properties of the
compound features inherent to the compound.7 1 The court improperly construed the
antidepressant properties for the reasons articulated below.
It is commonly accepted that the nature of chemical compounds is highly
unpredictable, especially in the field of medicinal chemistry.72 Courts have taken
this into consideration when looking at the structure of a compound to determine
obviousness under 35 U.S.C § 103. 7 3 Similarly, courts should consider the highly

65 The claims are no more specific than referring to the invention as a "floating dock." See U.S.
Patent No. 5,281,055 (issued Jan. 25, 1994).
66 EZDock, 276 F.3d at 1353.
67 See id. In Seal-Flex, even though the issue of limiting testing to features claimed in the
patent did not arise here, the Federal Circuit Court applied the facts of the case to find that because
the case involved an all-weather track, "the scope of the claimed invention.. carried the inherent
implication of performance in severe weather conditions" and therefore those features were inherent
to the claimed invention. SmithKline, 365 F.3d at 1319 (discussing Seal-Flex); see also EZDock, 276
F.3d at 1353 (discussing the reasoning in Manville Sales that "the nature of the invention
(luminaries) required durability so that the claims' reference to the subject matter placed that topic
within the proper frame of experimentation").
68 Manville Sales, 917 F.2d 544, 550-51 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (holding that "[w]hen durability in an
outdoor environment is inherent to the purpose of the invention then further testing to determine
the invention's ability to serve that purpose will not subject the invention to a section 102(b) bar").
69 Black's Law dictionary states that for something to be inherent is for it "[t]o exist as a
permanent, inseparable, or essential attribute or quality of a thing." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 798
(8th ed. 2004). "Existing in someone or something as a natural and inseparable quality,
characteristic, or right." WEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 943 (2d ed. 1979).

70 See SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 365 F.3d 1306, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
71 See Id. at 1320.
72 2 CHISUM, supra note 14, §5.04[6] n.3. "The unpredictable nature of chemical reactions is
especially pronounced, of course, when dealing with medicinal chemistry, where the biological
effects of chemical reactions may be exceedingly difficult to predict from the chemical structure of a
compound." Id.
73 See In re Mayne, 104 F.3d 1339, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
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unpredictable nature of chemicals when determining utility under 35 U.S.C. § 101,
because this analysis also involves looking at the structure of the chemical. In a
leading case in the field of chemical compounds, In re Papeseh, the court held that
due to the unpredictable nature of such chemicals, courts cannot consider structure
alone as the basis for determining patentability. 74 The court stated "from the
75
standpoint of patent law, a compound and all of its properties are inseparable."
Properties of the chemical compound considered inseparable from the structure
would qualify as inherent properties under the analysis of the court in EZ Dock.
Additionally, in Manvile, the court looked to the purpose of the invention to
determine whether the properties of that invention qualified as inherent. 76 Similar
to In re Papeseh, SmithKine involved a chemical compound, therefore, making the
properties of that compound inseparable from its structure. Additionally, the
invention in SmithKine served as an antidepressant and the properties of the
compound directly related to that purpose, thereby meeting the requirements
announced by the court in Manvile.77 It follows then, that the antidepressant
properties of PHC hemihydrate represent inherent properties of the compound.

Standards for the patenting of chemical entities have evolved. At one time, the
PTO focused only on the "structural obviousness" of the chemical entity. Under
this standard, the structural formula of the claimed compound was compared for
similarity with the structural formulae of known compounds. This regime did not
allow evidence of unexpected results to trump the conclusion of obviousness based
on structure. Over thirty years ago, courts recognized that unexpected properties
can show that a claimed compound that appeared to be obvious on structural
grounds was not obvious when looked at as a whole.

Id.
74 In

re Papesch, 315 F.2d 381, 391 (C.C.P.A. 1963).
(holding that failure to take into consideration the pharmaceutical or biological property
of a compound on the ground that its structure would be obvious to one ordinarily skilled in the art
is a fundamental error of law). Judge Rich stated:
From the standpoint of patent law, a compound and all of its properties are
inseparable; they are one and the same thing. The graphic formulae, and the
chemical nomenclature, the systems of classification and study such as the
concepts of homology, isomerism, etc., are mere symbols by which compounds can
be identified, classified, and compared. But a formula is not a compound and
while it may serve in a claim to identify what is being patented, as the metes and
bounds of a deed identify a plot of land, the thing that is patented is not
the formula but the compound identified by it. And the patentability of the thing
does not depend on the similarity of its formula to that of another compound but
of the similarity of the former compound to the latter. There is no basis in law for
ignoring any property in making such a comparison. An assumed similarity
based on a comparison of formulae must give way to evidence that the assumption
is erroneous.
Id.
76 917 F.2d at 550-51 (holding that "[w]hen durability in an outdoor environment is inherent to
the purpose of the invention then further testing to determine the inventions ability to serve that
purpose will not subject the invention to a section 102(b) bar.").
77See Id. (if inherent to the purpose of the invention then further testing will not subject it to
the §102(b) bar).
75 Id.
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B. The AntidepressantPropertiesofPHCHemihydrateInherent to its Structure
Would Establish Utility Under § 101 and § 112; Therefore, the Courts Must Consider
Those Same AntidepressantPropertiesin a § 102(b) Analysis
In order for an invention to qualify for a patent, the invention must meet three
basic requirements: it must be new, useful, and nonobvious. 78 Once a patent issues,
the courts give that patent a presumption of validity. 79 This presumption exists
because each patent application undergoes a series of rigorous tests in the United
States Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO") before the application issues as a
80
patent.
Claim 1 of the '723 patent made no specific reference to utility.8 1 Regardless of
whether the claims of the patent contain any specific reference to utility, the
invention remains incomplete unless its utility is either obvious or established by
proper tests.8 2 The '723 patent itself proves that utility under both § 101 and § 112
existed during prosecution in the USPTO, and therefore, the '723 patent should
83
remain valid until proven otherwise.
Since 35 U.S.C. § 101 has a low standard for establishing utility, if an invention
has any degree of usefulness, it will meet the utility requirement.84 If courts consider
only the structure of PHC hemihydrate, the structure does not render the utility of
8 5
the compound obvious because the structure alone does not suggest any utility.
However, if considered inherent, the properties of PHC hemihydrate would readily
86
satisfy this low standard.
The CAFC in SmithKline found that the invention had been reduced to practice
and, thus, did not apply the experimental use negation.8 7 However, there exists a

78 See

35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (2000).
§ 282 (2000).

79 35 U.S.C.

80 See Parker v. Motorola, Inc., 524 F.2d 518, 521 (5th Cir. 1975) (explaining that the
presumption of validity is based upon the "experience and expertise of the patent office ... and [a]
recognition that patent approval is a species of administrative determination supported by evidence"
and the standard of proof to rebut this presumption is "greater than [a] mere preponderance of
evidence.").
SI Claim 1 of the patent stated "paroxetine hydrochloride hemihydrate." U.S. Patent No.
4,721,723 (issued Jan. 26, 1988).
82 "Unless the utility could have been foretold with certainty, sufficient testing to establish the
practical utility of the compound is required to establish an actual reduction to practice." De Solms
v. Schoenwald, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d 1507, 1510-11 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int'f 1990). Evidence in SmithKline
showed that their plants had unwittingly manufactured PHC hemihydrate as early as 1984.
SmithKline, 365 F.3d at 1309. However, accidental practice of an invention is not a "conscious
incorporation of the invention in issue such as would constitute a reduction to practice." Josserand
v. Taylor, 138 F.2d 58, 65 (C.C.P.A. 1943); see also Mycogen Plant Sci., Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 243
F.3d 1316, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (reasoning that accidental, unappreciated reduction to practice,
should not constitute a "true" reduction to practice).
83 See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000); see also Apple Computer, Inc. v. Articulate Sys., Inc., 234 F.3d
14, 26 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (finding "[o]ne attacking the validity of a patent must present clear and
convincing evidence establishing facts that lead to the legal conclusion of invalidity").
84 See Commonwealth Eng'g Co. v. Ladd, 199 F. Supp. 51, 53 (D.D.C. 1961).
8" See In re Papesch, 315 F.2d 381, 391 (C.C.P.A. 1963).
8 Use of a chemical compound as an antidepressant would also provide the needed degree of
usefulness.
87 SmithKline, 365 F.3d at 1320.
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separate requirement of utility for reduction to practice.8 8 This requirement has a
higher standard than the utility requirement under § 101.89 Utility for the purpose
of reduction to practice requires that the invention not only work, but that it also
accomplishes the purpose intended. 90 If a court considers the chemical properties of
the compound for the lower standard of utility under § 101, that implies that those
same properties will be considered for the higher standard of utility associated with
reduction to practice. Because the utility of PHC hemihydrate based on its structure
alone is not obvious, the court must consider the chemical properties of the compound
to establish that utility. 91 In SmithKine, the intended purpose of PHC hemihydrate
was to work as an antidepressant. 92 Therefore, according to EZDock and the related
cases, the antidepressant properties of PHC hemihydrate are inherent to the
compound. As such, the CAFC erred in not considering the antidepressant properties
of PHC hemihydrate for the purpose of applying the public use bar under § 102(b).
Alternatively, if the courts choose not to consider the inherent properties of PHC
hemihydrate to determine utility, then such utility may be established through the
administration of proper tests. 93 It is important to note that even when those skilled
in the art know the behavior of analogous compounds, courts continue to require
evidence of utility.9 4 In SmithKline, PHC hemihydrate was a novel compound and
found to be more stable than its anhydrous form. 95 Therefore, tests done previously
on the anhydrous compound alone would not satisfy the requirement of adequate
testing. Since the clinical trials for PHC hemihydrate did not conclude until after the
filing date of the '723 patent, the inventor never completed the proper tests to
establish utility. However, because the USPTO granted the '723 patent, it can be
implied that the USPTO considered the properties of the chemical in its analysis of

88 See Estee Lauder v. L'Oreal, 129 F.3d 588, 593 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding that when testing is
necessary to establish utility, there must be recognition and appreciation that the tests were

successful for reduction to practice to occur).
89 See Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1228 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
Reduction to practice requires "the discovery that an invention actually works." Id. (emphasis
added). Reduction to practice is effected when the inventor's conception is in a form that is capable
of practical and successful use. Pyrene-Minimax Corp. v. Palmer, 89 F.2d 505, 510 (D.C. Cir. 1937).
90 See Burroughs Wellcome, 40 F.3d at 1228; Pyrene-Minimax,89 F.2d at 510.
91 In addition, "this court has held in several cases that it may be proper, in determining what
tests are necessary to constitute a reduction to practice, to take into consideration statements in the
specifications of the applications as well as limitations appearing in the counts of interference."
Blicke v. Treves, 241 F.2d 718, 721 (C.C.P.A. 1957). The antidepressant properties of PHC
hemihydrate are mentioned in the specifications of the SmithlMine patent. U.S. Patent No.
4,721,723 (issued Jan. 26, 1988).
92 In fact, in SmithKline's own words, "the purpose of the clinical trials was to establish that
PHC hemihydrate actually worked (and was safe) as an antidepressant." SmithKline, 365 F.3d at
1317.
9 See De Solms v. Schoenwald, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1507, 1510-11 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int'f
1990). Proper tests in this case would determine whether the invention actually works and
accomplishes the purpose intended, which in this case is to serve as an antidepressant.
94 See Fujikawa, 93 F.3d at 1564 (stating "It may be difficult to predict ... whether a novel
compound will exhibit pharmacological activity, even when the behavior of analogous compounds is
known to those skilled in the art. Consequently, testing is often required to establish practical
utility.").
9 SmithKline Beecham Corp., 365 F.3d at 1309.
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validity. 96 If the court finds utility based solely on the novel structure of a compound,

without considering the properties of the compound, it would essentially remove the
utility requirement from patent law and equate utility with the already existing,
separate requirement of novelty. 97 The SmithKline decision effectively does just that.

C The Decision of the Courtin SmithKline Sets a DangerousPrecedent That Future
Courts Will Struggle to Apply
Courts look to the totality of the circumstances to qualify a use of an invention
as experimental. 98 Applying this approach involves weighing several factors to
determine the nature of the use. 99 Additionally, courts attempt to strike a balance
between conflicting interests of the inventor and the public. This balancing of
interests examines the reasonable purpose of the applicant's acts at issue. 10 0 The
district court in SmithKline found the purpose of the use experimental, rather then
commercial by applying both approaches. 10 1
In this case, SmithKline brought suit only under claim 1 of the '723 patent. The
CAFC turned a blind eye to the analysis of the lower court and the overwhelming
evidence indicating the purpose and nature of the trials. In applying a narrow
construction of the "claimed feature of the invention" precedent 10 2 in conjunction with
96 The patent application in this case was filed on October 23, 1986 and the clinical trials
concluded on December 29, 1986, two months after the patent application was filed. SmithlMine
Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 286 F. Supp. 2d 925, 932 (N.D. Ill. 2001).

97See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (2000).
98 See Netscape Communications Corp. v. Konrad, 295 F.3d 1315, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Micro
Chem., Inc. v. Great Plains Chem. Co., 103 F.3d 1538, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Pfaff v. Wells Elec.,
Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 67 n.13 (1998) (observing that "whether a particular activity is experimental is
often clear.").
99See discussion suprapart I.A.2.
100 See Kimball Int'l, Inc. v. Allen Organ Co., 212 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 584, 586 (S.D. Ind. 1981)
("The determination of the inventor's purpose, motive, intent, etc., is essential in the determination
of the applicability of the experimental use doctrine."); 2 CHISUM, supra note 14, § 6.02[7][b] ("If the
purpose was experimental and the activity reasonable, it does not matter that the inventor benefits
incidentally from the activity.").
101 SmithlMine Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 286 F. Supp. 2d 925, 934-35 (N.D. Ill. 2001)
(the district court found the use to be experimental by weighing factors such as the length of the test
period, lack of payment for trials, implementation of strict controls and the visits to ensure that they
were followed, against the lack of a confidentiality agreement). Some cases have held that lack of a
confidentiality agreement is not dispositive to a finding of public use. Soo Tone Bros., Inc. v. Sysco
Corp., 28 F. 3d 1192, 1200 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Allied Colloids Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 64 F.3d
1570, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1995); TP Lab. v. Profl Positioners, Inc., 724 F.2d 965, 972 (Fed. Cir. 1984). In
Netscape Communications Corp, while holding that a lack of a confidentiality agreement was
significant, it was distinguishable from the case at hand because it involved disclosure of the
invention to experts in the field who fully understood the technology, while in SmithKline the
compound was distributed to a select group who were not in a position to know whether they were
taking the drug or a placebo and would not know how to duplicate the drug. See 295 F.3d at 1321.
102 See In re Application of Theis, 610 F.2d 786, 793 (C.C.P.A. 1979). This court and its
predecessor have noted that experimentation negates a bar when the inventor tests claimed features
of the invention. Id. (agreeing that "[i]t is settled law that the experimental sale exception does not
apply to experiments performed with respect to non-claimed features of an invention."); see also
Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Kent Indus., Inc., 409 F.2d 99, 101 (6th Cir. 1969); In ro Brigance, 792
F.2d 1103, 1109 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
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the claim-by-claim approach, the CAFC found claim 1 invalid.10 3 The claim-by-claim
approach limits the review of the court to each claim individually in order to
determine whether the public use bar applies.10 4 In this case the claim-by-claim
approach limited the review of the court to just the claim at issue.10 5 Under this
approach however, courts should consider other evidence present in the caseprecisely what the CAFC ignored in SmithKline.
The CAFC erred in its narrow construction of the claim-by-claim rule because it
did not place enough emphasis on the evidence of purpose and nature of the clinical
trials.1 0 6 In effect, the court ignored the evidence provided by the application of the
totality of the circumstances approach. In fact, the CAFC inadvertently undermined
its own narrow construction by attempting to distinguish SmithKine from cases
where courts had allowed experimental use on features not expressly claimed in the
patent. 10 7 The mere presence of such cases serves as strong evidence that a narrow
construction of the claim-by-claim approach will not work across the board.
Furthermore, this precedent has developed as a way for the court to avoid decisions
which, while technically applying the rules, do not make sense and do not advance
the policies set out by the court.
The SmithKLine decision establishes a dangerous precedent not only because a
decision based on such a narrow construction will prove difficult for courts to apply in
the future, but also because of the extreme potential changes to the settled
expectations of inventors.10 8 Additionally, this decision could undermine existing
patents by encouraging challenges to patents whose owners, in reliance on
established precedent, experimented with their invention prior to filing the
application. This decision will also discourage further invention and funding of
research, which strikes directly against the purpose of the patent system established

103 See SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 365 F.3d 1306, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(holding claim 1 invalid).
101See Allen Eng'g Corp. v. Bartell Indus., Inc., 299 F.3d 1336, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ("The onsale bar is evaluated on a claim-by-claim basis, so that some claims of a patent may be found to be
barred while others are not."); Lough v. Brunswick Corp., 86 F.3d 1113, 1122 n.5 (Fed.Cir. 1996)
("Each claim of the patent must be considered individually when evaluating a public use bar.").
105 See SmithKline Beecham Corp., 365 F.3d at 1320 (holding that it must look to only the
claim which is before it on appeal, but noting, however, that "the same clinical trials may serve to
negate a public use bar with regard to the inventions claimed in the more specific claims of the '723
patent.").
106 This evidence is provided through the application of the totality of the circumstances
approach. Netscape Communications Corp. v. Konrad, 295 F.3d 1315, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Micro
Chem., Inc. v. Great Plains Chem. Co., 103 F.3d 1538, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (explaining that "all of
the circumstances surrounding the sale or offer to sell, including the stage of development of the
invention and the nature of the invention, must be considered and weighted against the policies
underlying section 102(b)").
107 See, e.g., EZ Dock, Inc. v. Schafer Sys. Inc., 276 F.3d 1347, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Seal-Flex,
Inc. v. Athletic Track & Court Constr., 98 F.3d 1318, 1320, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Manville Sales
Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 550-51 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
108 See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 739 (2002)
(holding that "courts must be cautious before adopting changes that disrupt the settled expectations
of the inventing community" and that "the responsibility for changing them rests with Congress.
Fundamental alterations in these rules risk destroying the legitimate expectations of inventors in
their property."); see also Warner-Jenkinson v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 32 n.6 (1997).
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by the United States Constitution. 10 9 Not only does this decision contradict
established case law, but it also becomes difficult to reconcile considering the policies
which underlie the statutory public use bar. 110

D. Literal Construction of the Experimental Use Doctrineis Contraryto the
Substantive PrincipJesof PatentLaw
The application of the public use statutory bar necessarily involves the
application of several policies. Consideration of these policies is necessary because
they define the public use bar.11
Discussing these policies and their appropriate
application will demonstrate that, in this case, the CAFC's decision neither advances,
nor maintains, the policies underlying the public use bar. 112 Furthermore, this
113
decision does not follow the general policies underlying the patent law system.
The first policy deserving consideration in litigation is the presumption of
11 4
validity a court must afford the inventor when evaluating the claims of a patent.
11 5
Next, courts must consider the three policies underlying the statutory § 102(b) bar.
However, SmithKline only involved the public use side of § 102(b) and had no
implications of the on-sale statutory bar. Accordingly, the emphasis of the court's
analysis should concentrate on the policy preventing the removal of inventions from

109 For instance, this decision frustrates the confidence of investors in the United States patent
system in protecting their intellectual property rights and allowing an adequate return on their
investments. Inventors will be less willing to invest the money needed to develop new, potentially
life saving therapies resulting in deterred progress of useful arts and sciences. Brief of Washington
Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants' Petition for Rehearing En
Bane at 1, SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 365 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Nos. 03-1285,
03-1313).
110 First, this decision contradicts established case law by not considering a "totality of the
circumstances," the test established by case law discussed supra note 20. Second, this decision
violates established case law by distinguishing this case from the precedent cases discussed supra
note 24. Last, this decision conflicts with established practices of determining utility and it appears
that the court wants to allow patenting based strictly on the novelty of the compound without
establishing that the compound is useful. See supra notes 8-19 and accompanying text.
M See Tone Bros. v. Sysco Corp., 28 F.3d 1192, 1198 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (discussing how to apply
the totality of the circumstances approach so that it reflects the underlying policies of the public use
statutory bar).
112 See TP Labs., Inc. v. Prof l Positioners, Inc., 724 F.2d 965, 968 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (setting
forth the policies); see also Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 549 (Fed.
Cir. 1990).
113 This refers to not only the presumption of validity that must be given to a claim under 35
U.S.C. § 282 (2000), but also to the policy underlined in the U.S. constitution of promoting the
progress of science and useful arts, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
114 See 35 U.S.C. § 282; see also Apple Computer, Inc. v. Articulate Sys., Inc., 234 F.3d 14, 26
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (finding "[o]ne attacking the validity of a patent must present clear and convincing
evidence establishing facts that lead to the legal conclusion of invalidity.").
115 See TP Labs., Inc. v. Profl Positioners, Inc., 724 F.2d 965, 968 (Fed. Cir. 1984). The three
policies are: (1) encouraging the inventor to promptly disclose new and useful information; (2)
preventing the extension of the length of patent protection by not allowing the inventor to reap
commercial benefits for longer than the statutorily authorized period; and (3) discouraging the
removal of inventions from public domain which the public justifiably comes to believe are freely
available. See id.
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the public eye only when the public has come to rely upon them. 116 When applying
this policy, the court must balance public reliance against the interest of the
inventor, specifically the interest in perfecting the invention through
experimentation. 117 This balancing of policies involves an application of the
1 18
reasonable purpose test.
In SmithKline, no analysis of policy or balancing occurred. As discussed above,
SmithKine performed the clinical trials for experimental purposes.1 1 9 Furthermore,
the doctors and patients knew that the purpose of the clinical trials involved testing
whether a drug would work for its particular purpose. Testing a drug for such a
purpose necessarily means the drug is not yet a finished product, and cannot be
considered available for use by the general public. Consequently, the trials would not
warrant any expectation of further availability of the drug or detrimental reliance by
the public on the drug.
Additionally, the decision in SmithKline does nothing to further the inventor's
interest in perfecting his invention.1 20 No tests were performed before the trials,
which would showcase the drug as an effective antidepressant. In addition, as
discussed above, testing performed on analogous compounds should not be taken into
consideration.1 21 The district court, applying the balancing test, indicated that the
reasonable purpose of the experiments was to achieve the perfection of an invention
and found no detrimental reliance by the public in this case.1 22 If the public use bar
is defined by its policies, then the decision of the CAFC in SmithKline has redefined
the application of this bar and established precedent to effectively remove the
necessary policies from consideration in a public use analysis.

116 Cont'l Plastics Containers v. Owens Brockway Plastic Prods., 141 F.3d 1073, 1079 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (explaining that the primary policy underlying § 102(b) is detrimental reliance).
117 See Sehainholz, supra note 13, at 383 (explaining that this approach under the
experimental use doctrine is evidence of "society's willingness to accept the risk of detrimental
reliance when, because of the nature of the product, public experimentation must take place").
118 See Kimball Int'l, Inc. v. Allen Organ Co., 212 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 584, 586 (S.D. Ind. 1981)
("[t]he determination of the inventor's purpose, motive, intent, etc., is essential in the determination
of the applicability of the experimental use doctrine."); 2 CHISUM, supra note 14, § 6.02[7][b] ("If the
purpose was experimental and the activity reasonable, it does not matter that the inventor benefits
incidentally from the activity.").
119 This decision came from the application of the totality of the circumstances test coupled
with the policy analysis of the reasonable purpose test. The factual application of these tests is
discussed supra in notes 18-21 and the accompanying text.
120 Courts have recognized that an inventor may conduct extensive tests of his invention, even
in the public eye, if the tests are aimed to bring the invention to perfection or ascertain whether it
will work for the purpose intended. See City of Elizabeth v. Am. Nicholson Pavement Co., 97 U.S.
126, 134-35 (1877).
121 See Fujikawa v. Wattanasin, 93 F.3d 1559, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ("[Ilt may be difficult to
predict.., whether a novel compound will exhibit pharmacological activity, even when the behavior
of analogous compounds is known to those skilled in the art. Consequently, testing is often required
to establish practical utility.").
122 SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 286 F. Supp. 2d 925, 935 (N.D. Ill. 2001).
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III. PROPOSAL
To provide the public with proper notice and define the boundaries of legally
permissible conduct, laws should remain consistent and predictable. Stare decisis
provides consistency in judicial decision-making and allows the public to rely on case
law with confidence by reapplying past law in a similar manner, under similar
circumstances, in the future. 123 Confidence and the ability to rely on past law is
especially important in patent law, because confidence equals investments and
investments equal faster promotion and development of the useful arts and sciences.
A consistent and predictable approach promotes a sense of justice in the decisions of
the court. Such an approach based on stare decisis also allows the court to promote
and further the policy underlying the law while keeping sight of the effect the
decisions will have on the body of law. Policy in effect is a litmus test of law. If the
decision furthers or at least maintains the policy underlying the set of laws applied,
it is most likely correct. However, a decision that diminishes or undermines the
underlying policy likely requires a change. This section proposes two solutions or
adjustments to the application of the statutory bar under § 102(b) and the
experimental use negation which would allow for a more consistent and predictable
approach than the law currently permits.

A. The Claim -hy-Claim Approach Should Be Eliminatedin Evaluating
Experimental Use
In SmithKline, the court attempted to set a bright line approach to the
application of the public use bar. 124 However, such an approach is unnecessary,
unjustified and undermines the definition of the public use bar. While a bright line
approach may serve a function in creating consistent and predictable decisions, such
an approach also diminishes those decisions because it does not reflect the purpose
behind the underlying laws and disturbs the public's sense of justice.
The claim-by-claim approach applied to the public use bar sets a bright line
test. 125 However, the language of § 102(b) does not justify its application. The claimby-claim approach is unjustified because in order to apply it the court must look at
1 26
each claim of the patent as an individual invention.
The statutory bar under § 102(b) applies when "the invention was ... in public
use . . . more than one year prior to the date of the application for patent in the

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1443 (8th ed. 2004) ("To abide by, or adhere to, decided cases").
See SmithlMine Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 365 F.3d 1306, 1319-20 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
125 Allen Eng'g Corp. v. Bartell Indus., Inc., 299 F.3d 1336, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ("The on-sale
bar is evaluated on a claim-by-claim basis, so that some claims of a patent may be found to be barred
while others are not."); See Lough v. Brunswick Corp., 86 F.3d 1113, 1122 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(stating that each claim of the patent must be considered individually when evaluating a public use
bar).
126 See SmitthKline, 365 F.3d at 1320 (finding the "trials were not an experimental use of the
invention in claim 1" of the '723 patent) (emphasis added)).
12:

124
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United States." 127 Similarly, the cases applying the experimental use negation refer
128
to the "invention" as the subject of the tests.
The claims of a patent define the invention.1 29 However, each patent can only
have one claimed invention. 130 The court in SmithKline incorrectly characterizes the
claim language of claim 1 of the '723 patent as "the invention of claim 1.131 Such a
characterization is misleading because it implies that the "invention" of claim 1
differs from what is stated in the other claims. The language of the claims differ in
order to define the invention as broadly as possible. However, all of the claims define
a single "invention."1 3 2 Therefore, courts should view the claims of the patent as a
whole when evaluating the claimed invention.
The definition of the term "invention" also supports this conclusion. Professor
Chisum defines the word "invention" as "subject matter described and/or claimed in a
patent, patent application or prior art reference (e.g., a product or process)."133 This
definition refers to the subject matter claimed in the patent as a whole and not by
individual claims. The experimental use negation is a judicially developed doctrine,
and if the courts intended for the test to be applied individually to each claim they
would undoubtedly refer to the claims of the patent and not the invention.
Courts should abandon the claim-by-claim approach as it applies to the
statutory bar under § 102(b) because it yields results that do not advance the policies
of the bar described above. Compliance with these policies is critical since the public
use bar is in effect defined by policy.13 4 When applying the public use bar, courts
continue to emphasize the policy of preventing detrimental reliance on a product by
the public. 1 3 5 No evidence of detrimental reliance on the part of the subjects involved

127

35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000) (emphasis added).

128

See SmithIKline, 365 F.3d at 1317-18 (finding that the experimental use negation does not

apply to unclaimed features of the invention). "It is settled law that ... [an] experimental sale ...
does not apply to experiments performed with respect to non-claimed features of an invention." In
reApplication of Theis, 610 F.2d 786, 793 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (emphasis added).
129 See Altoona Publix Theatres, Inc. v. Am. Tri-Ergon Corp., 294 U.S. 477, 487 (1935); Gen.
Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp. 304 U.S. 365 n.5 (1938).
130

So Puett Elee. Starting Gate Corp. v. Harford Agrie. & Breeders' Ass'n, 88 F.

Supp.

360,

370 (D. Md. 1949) ("Only one invention can be embraced in single patent.").
131 "Because claim 1 covers the compound without further limitation, the invention of claim 1
was reduced to practice when that compound was first manufactured." SmithKline Beecham Corp.,
365 F.3d at 1320.

132

Monsanto Chem. Co. v. Coe, 145 F.2d 18, 19 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1944) ("Two or more independent

inventions can not be claimed in one application; but where several distinct inventions are
dependent upon each other and mutually contribute to produce a single result they may be claimed
in one application....").

Discussing the word invention, Professor Chisum states:
In patent law, the word "invention" has several different meanings. It may refer
to (1) the act of invention through original conception and reduction to practice;
(2) subject matter described and/or claimed in a patent, patent application or prior
art reference (e.g., a product or process); or (3) the patentability requirement of
invention, first developed by the courts and now subsumed in the statutory
requirement of nonobviousness.
1 CHISUM, supra note 14, Glossary, at 3.
134 See Tone Bros. v. Sysco Corp., 28 F.3d 1192, 1198 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
135 Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 549 (Fed. Cir. 1990); see also
Upadhye supra note 7; Cont'l Plastics Containers v. Owens Brockway Plastic Prods., 141 F.3d 1073,
133
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in the clinical trials existed in SmithKline. Thus, this decision significantly weakens
136
the inventor's right to perfect his invention.
Abandoning the claim-by-claim approach would have no ill effects on any of the
laws applied to the experimental use doctrine, such as the "claimed feature of the
invention" precedent, because it refers to the subject matter of the patent as the
"invention" and not the claims. 13 7 Applying the "invention as a whole" test proposed
here would allow the court to not only apply its previous decisions that have
developed the doctrine, but also drive the experimental use doctrine in a direction
which will yield predictable and consistent results. Additionally the "invention as a
whole" approach would produce results consistent with the policies underlying the
statutory bar. Furthermore, the decisions would become predictable because as the
United States Supreme Court in Pfaff v. Wells Electronics observed, "whether a
particular activity is experimental is often clear," and in cases where it is not, the
138
courts remain free to apply the precedent in the experimental use doctrine.
Applying the proposed analysis to SmithKline, the antidepressant properties of
the chemical become expressly claimed features of the invention. The properties
were outlined in claims 5 and 6 of the '723 patent. 13 9 Moreover, this decision would
have no effect on the detrimental reliance on the drug by the public, while
140
encouraging the inventor to perfect his invention.

1079 (Fed. Cir. 1998). For other policies considered by the court when applying the public use bar
under § 102(b) see TP Labs., Inc. v. Profi Positioners, Inc., 724 F.2d 965, 968 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
136 When the delay to take out a patent is justified by a bona fide effort "to bring [the] invention
to perfection, or to ascertain whether it will answer the purpose intended" the inventor does not
acquire an undue advantage over the public because it is in the public's interest that "the invention
should be perfect and properly tested before a patent is granted." SmithKline Beecham Corp. v.
Apotex Corp., 286 F. Supp. 2d 925, 933 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (quoting Pfaff v. Wells Elec., Inc., 525 U.S.
55, 64 (1999)). Through the reasonable purpose analysis it follows that if there is no detrimental
reliance by the public on the invention and there is a significant interest on the part of the inventor
to perfect his invention then the reasonable purpose of the tests is experimental and if in this
circumstance the decision significantly harms the interest of the inventor the balance of the policies
is not considered.
137 "Testing or experimentation performed with respect to non-claimed features of the device
does not show that the invention was the subject of experimentation." W. Marine Elec. v. Furuno
Elecs. Co., 764 F.2d 840, 847 (Fed. Cir. 1985). "Each of those cases permitted testing to negate the
[public use] bar when the experimentation improves or verifies a feature inherent in the express
claims of the invention." SmithKline, 365 F.3d at 1319 (emphasis added); see also Cont'l Plastic
Containers, 141 F.3d at 1079 (explaining that tests of an invention that has been reduced to
practice, will not qualify for experimental use for purposes of negating a bar under § 102(b)).
138 See Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, 525 U.S. 55, 67 n. 13 (1998).
139 U.S. Patent No. 4,721,723 (issued Jan. 26, 1988). The claims state "5. An anti-depressant
pharmaceutical composition comprising an effective anti-depressant amount of crystalline
paroxetine hydrochloride hemihydrate and a pharmaceutically acceptable carrier." and "6. A method
of treatment ofdepression in mammals, which method comprises administering an effective amount
of crystalline paroxetine hydrochloride hemihydrate." Id. (emphasis added).
140 An inventor may conduct extensive tests of his invention if the experiments are aimed to
bring the invention to perfection or ascertain whether it will work for the purpose intended. See
Pfaff 525 U.S. 55, 64 (1999); Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 550 (Fed.
Cir. 1990); see also Conti Plastics, 141 F.3d at 1079 (the primary policy behind § 102(b) is
detrimental reliance).
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B. Application of the Experimental Use Doctrine only to "ClaimedFeaturesof the
Invention"Should be Consideredas Factorin the Totality of the Circumstances
Analysis ofPublic Use Under§ 102(b)
As it stands now, whether the feature being tested is expressly included in the
individual claim is a dispositive factor in applying the experimental use doctrine.
However, this approach proves both erroneous and misleading.14 1 The court itself
acknowledged that cases exist where experimentation with respect to features not
expressly claimed in the patent will not invalidate the patent for public use because
those features are considered "inherent" to the claim. 1 4 2 The confusion over the
definition of an inherent feature necessarily leads to inconsistent results.
The court should not abandon the necessary claimed "feature of the invention"
test. However, modifying this test to align it with the goals underlying experimental
use would create a test that yields consistent predictable results. Developing a
burden of proof to establish a feature as inherent would allow the court to apply the
current test only where a party could not meet that burden. However, once the
burden is met, the court, as part of a balancing test should consider the degree of
inherency of the feature to the actual claimed invention. The balancing test should
consist of this factor weighed against the factors considered by the court as a part of
the totality of the circumstances test, 143 and then evaluated with the goals of the
144
aforementioned policies in mind.
This approach would allow the court flexibility in cases where applying a strict
interpretation of the rules would be the same as trying to fit a square peg in a round
hole given that the decision would not make sense on a policy level. The support of
policies underlying experimental use is important because those policies define the
1 45
statutory bar.

141

If the experiments are not testing a claimed feature of the invention, the experimental use

doctrine cannot be applied. See generally EZDock, 276 F.3d at 1347; Seal-Flex, 98 F.3d at 1318;
Manville Sales, 917 F.2d at 544. However, as of now, courts allow an exception of sorts when the
tests are directed toward a feature that is "inherent" to the invention. See generallyEZDock,276
F.3d at 1347; S /al-Flex,
98 F.3d at 1318; Manville Sales, 917 F.2d at 544. Unfortunately the
standard of proof needed to show a feature to be "inherent" is set extraordinarily high as a result of
SmithKline. See SmithKline, 365 F.3d at 1320 (holding that testing of the antidepressant
properties of the chemical structure is not testing an inherent feature).
1412See generally EZ Dock, 276 F.3d at 1347; Seal-Flex, 98 F.3d at 1318; Manville Sales, 917
F.2d at 544.
143 See Netscape Communications Corp. v. Konrad, 295 F.3d 1315, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Micro
Chem., Inc. v. Great Plains Chem. Co., 103 F.3d 1538, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (explaining that "all of
the circumstances surrounding the sale or offer to sell, including the stage of development of the
invention and the nature of the invention, must be considered and weighed against the policies
underlying section 102(b)."). Specifically, courts have looked to factors, including but not limited to,
length of test period, whether the inventor received payment for the testing, any obligation of
confidentiality, whether any records of testing and progress were made, whether persons other than
the inventor performed the testing, and the number of tests performed. Baxter Int'l, Inc. v. Cobe
Labs., Inc., 88 F.3d 1054, 1060 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
144 See Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 550 (Fed. Cir. 1990); see
also TP Labs., Inc. v. Prof 1 Positioners, Inc., 724 F.2d 965, 968 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Cont'l Plastics
Containers v. Owens Brockway Plastic Prods., 141 F.3d 1073, 1079 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
145 Tone Bros. v. Sysco Corp., 28 F.3d 1192, 1198 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ("[P]olicies behind the bar, in
effect, define it.").
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IV. CONCLUSION

By applying the statutory public use bar and holding the clinical trials in
SmithKline did not constitute an experimental use, the CAFC has set the bar too
high. Applying a narrow construction of the law, the CAFC invalidated a claim in a
clear case of experimental use. The decision not only misapplied the precedent
defining an "inherent" feature of the invention, but essentially eliminated the
application of policies underlying the public use bar.
Such decisions severely alter the expectations of inventors by weakening their
interest in perfecting their inventions and diminishing the need for the analysis of
policy which drives the bar. Additionally, this decision encourages potential
infringers to look for loopholes in patents based on the strict and narrow construction
of experimental use advanced by the CAFC. 146 A new test should be applied which
strengthens the rights of patent holders and encourages the progress of useful
sciences as Congress intended. Therefore, the claim-by-claim approach should be
eliminated in evaluating experimental use. The application of the experimental use
doctrine to "claimed features of the invention" should only be considered as a factor
in the totality of the circumstances analysis of public use under § 102(b).

146 See gonerally Brief of Washington Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Plaintiffs-Appellants' Petition for Rehearing En Bane, at 3, SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex
Corp., 365 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2004).

